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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, 
AND NATIVE BIODIVERSITY: CONVENTION AND 
PROGRESSION IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
David J. Jefferson and Kamalesh Adhikari 
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (Trans-Pacific Partnership or Partnership) is a major 
multilateral trade agreement between Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam that entered into 
force in December 2018. The Partnership, like many other bilateral, regional, and 
trans-regional trade treaties that have been enacted since the mid-1990s, is polemical, 
due in large part to its perceived effects on small scale agriculture, native biodiversity, and 
local and Indigenous peoples. Civil society criticisms have centred especially on how the 
Trans-
privatisation of plants, seeds, and other genetic resources at the expense of customary 
practices. The present article analyses these provisions, while also discussing the treatment 
of traditional knowledge in the Partnership, which is relatively progressive in comparison 
to prior free trade agreements. The article concludes by deriving lessons that civil society 
activists, local and Indigenous communities, and domestic authorities could derive from 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, towards the end of identifying policy space for the 
protection of traditional knowledge and native biodiversity.  
I INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the course of negotiations that led to the signing of the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (Trans-Pacific Partnership or Partnership), 
a multilateral trade agreement that entered into force in 2018, civil society protests in several 
member countries railed against the perceived effects of the treaty on small scale agriculture, 
native biodiversity, and local and Indigenous peoples. The tensions that characterised these 
manifestations had similarly underpinned decades of criticism of prior trade agreements, 
dating to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the 
World Trade Organization (1995).  
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Subsequently, a series of bilateral and regional accords continued to provoke social unrest, 
culminating with the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the correspondingly expansive Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2020).1  While the controversy that these commercial 
treaties have provoked generally arises out of dissatisfaction with the globalised neoliberal 
economic model, the potential disruption of ancestral forms of agricultural production and 
uses of native biodiversity are particularly polemical issues. 
Civil society activism in this space has specifically targeted trade agreements that require 
member countries to implement domestic intellectual property laws that are consistent with 
the 1991 Act of the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV; 1991). This Act 
provides a mechanism through which plant breeders can claim exclusive legal rights to new 
plant varieties, enabling the formation of temporary commercial monopolies over the 
production, reproduction, and sale of these plants. For decades, critics have derided the 
UPOV model as detrimental to small-scale traditional agricultural production, which 
remains significant for cultural reification and provides the basis for food and livelihood 
security in places where local and Indigenous peoples rely on the regular use and circulation 
of native crops and plants. The international not-for-profit organisation GRAIN 
conceptualises the problem as the privatisation of seeds, because intellectual property and 
related legal regimes tend to favour large-scale commercial production to the detriment of 
intergenerational practices of seed conservation, utilisation, and exchange by local and 
Indigenous peoples.2  
In contrast to mandating adherence to certain intellectual property standards, free trade 
agreements do not require parties to join other international treaties that are designed to 
enable local and Indigenous peoples to better manage, and to benefit from, biodiversity and 
associated traditional knowledge. The most prominent of these treaties are the Convention on 
                                                 
1 Note that the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership was signed in 2020 but at the time 
of writing had not yet entered into force. For an overview of the criticisms that have been launched 
against the TRIPS Agreement, see Carlos M Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing 
Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options. (Zed Books, 2000).   
2  GRAIN (Article, 3 December 2019) 
<https://grain.org/en/article/6372-asia-under-threat-of-upov-91>. 
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Biological Diversity (CBD; 1993) and its Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (Nagoya Protocol; 2014), and the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Plant Treaty; 2004). While 
3 agreements require member countries 
to adopt national legal and policy frameworks to ensure that native biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge are not misappropriated. The CBD, Nagoya Protocol, and Plant 
Treaty further aim to protect the rights of local and Indigenous peoples in accordance with 
the internationally-agreed principles of prior informed consent and benefit sharing.4  
Given that the Trans-Pacific Partnership expressly endorses the UPOV Convention but not 
the CBD, the Nagoya Protocol, or the Plant Treaty, it is not surprising that environmental 
and Indigenous rights activists sought to derail negotiations towards this regional trade 
agreement. Civil society concerns were compounded by the fact that the United States, 
Japan, and Singapore had initially proposed a clause that would require parties to the 
Partnership to make patents available for inventions involving plants and animals.5 While 
the UPOV Convention provides an international framework for the protection of plant 




                                                 
3 rtaining 
to or derived from natural biodiversity, may be obtained, and how the benefits that result from their 
use should be shared between the people or countries using the resources and the people or countries 
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Brochure, 2010) <https://www.cbd.int/abs/infokit/brochure-en.pdf>.   
4  ss: Moving Beyond the Remits of International 
Biodiversity, Genetic Resources and 
Intellectual Property: Developments in Access and Benefit Sharing (Routledge, 2018). 
5 -Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)  IP Chapter (second publication), 
WikiLeaks (Blog Post, 16 October 2014), art QQ.E.1(3), <https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/>. 
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The possibility that the Trans-Pacific Partnership would enable more widespread 
commercialisation of agricultural biotechnologies was met by local protests against 
genetically-modified seeds and foods, in countries including Chile,6 Malaysia,7 and Aotearoa 
New Zealand.8 More broadly, the negotiation process provoked contentious reactions to 
the speculation that the Partnership, and neoliberal approaches to transnational relations in 
general, might further marginalise ethnic minority and Indigenous communities. For 
 New Zealand argued that the special protections they enjoy 
under the Treaty of Waitangi were directly threatened by the trade deal.9 
In the context of this history of activism against trade treaties, the present article analyses 
key provisions of the Trans-Pacific Partnership that are relevant to the protection of local 
production and biodiversity conservation. In so doing, the article critically assesses the 
provisions 
chapters contain provisions designed to regulate a common set of biological objects, 
including plants, seeds, and other genetic resources. Furthermore, both of these chapters 
provide a basis to identify the policy space that countries may require for the creative 
formation of domestic legislative and regulatory frameworks on plant variety protection, 
patent examination, traditional knowledge protection, and access and benefit sharing related 
to the utilisation of plants, seeds, and other genetic resources.  
                                                 
6 
El Mostrador (Article, 2 April 2019) 
<https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2019/04/02/guardadora-de-semillas-explica-por-que-
esta-contra-el-tpp-11-es-un-nuevo-colonialismo/>. 
7 GRAIN (Article, 18 
July 2016) <https://grain.org/article/entries/5511-new-trade-deals-legalise-corporate-theft-make-
farmers-seeds-illegal>. 
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ational 
level.10 This notion, which refers to actions that countries can take to uphold their treaty 
obligations while simultaneously exploiting gaps in dominant legal regimes to generate 
alternative, local approaches to agroeconomic and environmental governance, remains 
relevant following the adoption of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The diverse biocultural 
realities of Partnership member countries continue to require space for the formation of 
domestic laws that both uphold international commitments and are responsive to local 
needs.     
II INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT VARIETIES, AND 
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
The negotiations during which the Trans-Pacific Partnership was developed formally 
commenced in February 2008. The secrecy and lack of transparency with which initial talks 
were conducted drew widespread criticism.11 Opponents of the Partnership were partially 
in October 2014. The preliminary chapter on intellectual property contained several 
that all parties ratify or accede to UPOV 199112 and the aforementioned mandate that 
13 Notably, 
however, the text alternately proposed an exclusion from patentability for plants and 
                                                 
10 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 1012; David J 
in Kamalesh Adhikari and David J Jefferson (eds) Intellectual Property Law and Plant Protection: Challenges 
and Developments in Asia (Routledge, 2019). 
11 -Pacific Partnership 
Sites: A Journal of Social Anthropology and Cultural Studies 187. 
12 -Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)  
WikiLeaks (Blog Post, 16 October 2014), art QQ.A.8(c), <https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/>.  
13 Ibid art QQ.E.1(3). 
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animals other than microorganisms, which all parties to the negotiations other than the 
United States, Japan, and Singapore endorsed.14 Consistent with the TRIPS Agreement,15 
this alternative proposal would allow parties to provide intellectual property protection for 
plant varieties under either existing patent laws or sui generis legal frameworks designed by 
lawmakers at the national level. 
In its enacted form, the intellectual property chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
generally reproduces the terms of the TRIPS Agreement, allowing plants to be excluded 
from patentability. However, unlike TRIPS and the initial drafts of the Partnership, the final 
agreement mandates that members provide intellectual property protection for inventions 
that are derived from plants under their national patent laws.16 
is not provided in the treaty, so presumably this concept is left to domestic lawmakers to 
define. The Partnership further requires parties that are not currently members of the 
UPOV Convention to ratify or accede to the 1991 Act.17 Countries are afforded a brief 
transition period in which to pursue UPOV membership, amounting to three years for 
Brunei Darussalam18 and four years for Malaysia19 and Mexico.20  
Meanwhile, the agreement grants special concessions to Aotearoa New Zealand, allowing 
the country to elect to join UPOV 1991, or adopt a sui generis plant variety rights system that 
Partnership.21 The difference between these options is subtle, and it is unclear who would 
                                                 
14 Ibid art QQ.E.1(ALT 3). 
15 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, signed 15 April 1994, entered into 
force 1 January 1995, art 27.3(b). 
16 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, opened for signature 8 March 2018, 
entered into force 30 December 2018, art 18.37(4). 
17 Ibid art 18.7(2)(d). 
18 Ibid art 18.83(4)(a)(i). 
19 Ibid art 18.83(4)(b)(iv). 
20 Ibid art 18.83(4)(c)(i). 
21 Ibid annex 18-A(1). 
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be responsible for determining whether a prospective New Zealand plant variety rights law 
adequately gives effect to the 1991 Act of UPOV. If this were left to national lawmakers to 
decide, then New Zealand could potentially avoid implementing the most controversial 
provisions of the UPOV framework, such as restrictions on the saving and exchange of 
seeds by local and Indigenous cultivators.22  
Furthermore, the Trans-Pacific Partnership specifically states that the intellectual property 
obligations which New Zealand has assumed under the agreement do not preclude the 
abilit
23 The exception may 
efore 
the Waitangi Tribunal 24  in 2016. 25  
consultation with and iwi in developing this exception should be understood as a 
procedural failure under the Treaty of Waitangi framework, the express exemption from the 
26 
Unfortunately, however, similar exceptions to the intellectual property requirements 
imposed by the Trans-Pacific Partnership were not recognised for parties other than 
                                                 
22 
authorisation from the breeder to utilise propagating material and harvested material of protected 
plant varieties for most purposes, other than acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes, 
or for experimental purposes. See International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, signed 
2 December 1961, as Revised at Geneva on 10 November 1972, on 23 October 1978, and on 19 
March 1991, arts 14, 15.  
23 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, opened for signature 8 March 2018, 
entered into force 30 December 2018. Annex 18-A(2). 
24  The Waitangi Tribunal is a standing commission of inquiry that has exclusive authority to 
determine the meaning and effect of the Treaty of Waitangi. It makes recommendations on claims 
bro
Waitangi Tribunal (Web Page) <https://waitangitribunal.govt.nz/about-waitangi-
tribunal/>. 
25 Trans-Pacific Partnership in 
7(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 286, 307. 
26 Ibid. 
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Aotearoa New Zealand. This means that all of the other countries that have joined the 
Partnership must ratify or accede to UPOV 1991. For several parties this requirement is 
inconsequential, given that at the time of signing Australia, Canada, Japan, Peru, Singapore, 
and Vietnam were already members of UPOV 1991. In contrast, for other countries, namely 
Brunei, Chile,27 Malaysia, and Mexico, the obligation to adhere to the 1991 Act of UPOV is 
expected to have a significant impact on domestic policy, and by extension on local 
agricultural practices.  
In this way, the Trans-Pacific Partnership may be viewed through the lens of older critiques 
-
obligations on countries over and above the relatively more flexible terms of the TRIPS 
Agreement. 28  Nevertheless, the policy space carved out by New Zealand provides an 
interesting example of how countries could resist the globalisation of intellectual property 
 
III PATENT EXAMINATION, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, AND 
GENETIC RESOURCES 
Although the intellectual property chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is generally 
conventional, mirroring the terms of other recent bilateral and regional free trade 
agreements, its provisions on traditional knowledge are unusual. The Partnership appears 
property systems and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources to each 
29  Furthermore, parties to the agreement have undertaken a commitment to 
cooperate, through their national intellectual property agencies or other relevant institutions, 
                                                 
27 Note, however, that Chile had previously incurred the obligation to join UPOV 1991 through 
other trade agreements, including with the United States, Japan, and Australia. David J Jefferson, 
Towards an Ecological Intellectual Property: Reconfiguring Relationships Between People and Plants in Ecuador 
(Routledge, 2020) 66. 
28 See, eg, Journal of 
World Intellectual Property 791. 
29 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, opened for signature 8 March 2018, 
entered into force 30 December 2018, art 18.16(1). 
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to enhance the understanding of issues arising out of the relationship between traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources.30 These concepts are not defined in the Partnership, but 
their meaning may be imputed by referring to other international instruments including the 
CBD, Nagoya Protocol, and Plant Treaty, which are implicitly referenced in the trade and 
biodiversity section of the environment chapter.31  
32 This is relevant because over the past several decades, numerous patents in 
countries around the world have been challenged and, in some instances, rescinded based 
on evidence that the claimed invention was not novel, but in fact was directly informed by 
33 
have involved inventions that were analogous to or derived from customary uses of native 
plants and other genetic resources. Notorious examples include patent claims for fungicidal 
uses of the neem tree (Azadirachta indica),34 utilisation of Hoodia gordonii as an appetite 
suppressant, 35  and extracts from Kakadu plum (Terminalia ferdinandiana) for cosmetic 
products.36 
                                                 
30 Ibid art 18.16(2). 
31 
which they are party play an important role, globally and domestically, in protecting the 
environment ). 
32 Ibid art 18.16(3). 
33 Biopiracy is a term that encompasses various forms of misappropriation of biological resources or 
traditional knowledge, including through intellectual property claims filed by people living outside of 
the communities in which a given resources or knowledge was obtained. Daniel Robinson, Confronting 




Hoodia Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit Sharing (Springer, 2009) 
89. 
36 dentifying and Preventing Biopiracy in Australia: Patent 
Australian Geographer 311. 
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Although the Trans-Pacific Partnership does not create a mechanism to mitigate against the 
misappropriation of traditional knowledge, the agreement does mandate that its parties 
37 The Partnership suggests 
that this could be achieved by implementing new protocols that patent examiners would 
need to follow, including the requirement to take publicly available traditional knowledge 
into account when determining prior art for inventions involving genetic resources. 38 
National intellectual property offices could also permit third parties to lodge written 
submissions that would have the effect of undermining the novelty of inventions for which 
there is relevant traditional knowledge.39 The Partnership further envisages that countries 
could utilise databases or digital libraries containing local and Indigenous knowledge in the 
course of patent examination, and that Partnership parties could cooperate in the training 
of patent examiners in the assessment of applications related to traditional knowledge.40   
These provisions are noteworthy because they acknowledge that existing intellectual 
property frameworks should be modified to prevent the misappropriation of traditional 
knowledge about native biodiversity. Such misuse is relevant to international trade, which 
frequently involves the privatisation and commercialisation of plants, seeds, and other 
products derived from genetic resources originally obtained from local and Indigenous 
ration in 
the area of traditional knowledge will lead to any actual changes in national patent 
examination protocols.  
                                                 
37 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, opened for signature 8 March 2018, 
entered into force 30 December 2018, art 18.16(3). 
38 Ibid art 18.16(3)(a). 
39 Ibid art 18.16(3)(b). 
40 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, opened for signature 8 March 2018, 
entered into force 30 December 2018, arts 18.16(3)(c) and (d). 
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Rather than agreeing to reform their respective domestic legal and regulatory systems, the 
parties to the Partnership have merely stated 
41 a phrasing that does not impose any enforceable obligations.  
Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the provisions on traditional knowledge that 
appear in the enacted version of the Partnership are significantly weaker than the language 
that some parties proposed during the negotiation process. The draft intellectual property 
chapter that was leaked in 2014 revealed that several countries endorsed a clause that would 
 Parties recognize that the intellectual property system may be one possible 
means to protect the traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and traditional 
42 Although this clause would not 
have required member countries to actually reform their domestic intellectual property laws, 
it might have encouraged some governments to develop sui generis legal frameworks designed 
to enable local and Indigenous communities to protect their knowledge and cultural 
expressions.  
Another proposal that was advanced in the 2014 draft agreement but not included in the 
measures to address situations of non-compliance
of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge.43 Although few of the countries 
that have ratified the Partnership have enacted national policy frameworks to regulate the 
access and utilisation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge,44 the proposed clause 
potentially could have allowed parties that have enacted such laws to use trade sanctions 
under the Partnership as an enforcement tool.  
                                                 
41 Ibid art 18.16(3). 
42 -Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)  IP Chapter (second publication), 
WikiLeaks (Blog Post, 16 October 2014), art QQ.E.23(4), <https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/>.  
43 Ibid art QQ.E.23(7).  
44 These countries are Japan, Mexico, and Vietnam, in addition to certain Australian jurisdictions 
(notably Queensland and the Northern Territory). Peru has also implemented an access and benefit 
sharing domestic policy framework; however, this country has signed but not yet ratified the Trans-
Pacific Partnership.  
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Finally, another provision that was proposed in the 2014 dr
45 This language was proposed by 
all of the signatories to the Partnership except Canada and Japan, with no opposition noted 
in the 2014 document, so it is unclear why it was not adopted in the final agreement.     
In addition to the provisions on traditional knowledge and genetic resources that appear in 
the intellectual property chapter, the Partnership contains a chapter on environmental issues. 
This is not entirely novel, given that prior free trade agreements including several treaties 
executed between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and other countries also 
included sections on trade and sustainable development. 46  Similarly, many of the 
commercial agreements that the United States has signed with trading partners include 
chapters on environmental protection.47 It is possible that the language employed in the 
environment chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership was originally drafted by negotiators 
from the United States, prior to its withdrawal from the agreement in 2016. This can be 
deduced from the fact that Article 20.13 on Trade and Biodiversity of the Partnershi
environment chapter is an almost verbatim reflection of the language that appears in Article 
24.15 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement. 
Notwithstanding its appearance in other international agreements, the trade and biodiversity 
provisions that were included in the Partnership are noteworthy for their recognition of the 
                                                 
45 -Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP)  IP Chapter (second publication), 
WikiLeaks (Blog Post, 16 October 2014), art QQ.E.23(6), <https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/>.  
46 These include the free trade agreements in place between the EFTA and Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Central American States, Georgia, Philippines, Ecuador, Indonesia, Turkey, 
European Free Trade 
Association (Web Page) <https://www.efta.int/Free-Trade/Trade-and-Sustainable-Development-
EFTAs-FTAs-520246>. 
47 These include the free trade agreements in place between the United States and Australia, Bahrain, 
CAFTA-DR, Chile, Colombia, Korea, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru, and the United States-
Mexico- Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (Web Page) <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements>. 
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knowledge and practices.48 Furthermore, the Partnership also acknowledges that some 
member countries have made international commitments or adopted national measures 
relating to access and benefit sharing,49 
nd 
experiences related to access and benefit sharing.50 Finally, the Partnership states that given 
the importance of public participation and consultation in the development and 
implementation of policies concerning conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, 
activities related to these issues.51  
sustainable use of biodiversity, the acknowledgement of the significance of public 
participation and consultation, and the commitment to cooperation among members of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership should be regarded as indicators of the extent to which concerns 
over environmental issues have permeated international legal discourse. However, like the 
express inclusion of traditional knowledge in the intellectual property chapter, in practice it 
 
operate to curtail international commercial activities between member countries.  
These provisions could have been strengthened, for example, by mandating that parties to 
the Partnership adhere to the Nagoya Protocol and the Plant Treaty, and that they adopt 
benefit sharing, and the rights of local and Indigenous communities, including in relation to 
their traditional knowledge. In theory, the inclusion of such a requirement would have been 
practicable, given that the Partnership explicitly requires adherence to other international 
agreements such as the UPOV Convention, as described above.  
                                                 
48 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, opened for signature 8 March 2018, 
entered into force 30 December 2018, art 20.13(3). 
49 Ibid art 20.13(4). 
50 Ibid art 20.13(6). 
51 Ibid art 20.13(5). 
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Furthermore, the environment chapter of the Partnership requires that all par
adopt, maintain and implement laws, regulations and any other measures to fulfil its 
obligations under the Convention on International Trade in endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES condition could be formulated 
in relation to the Nagoya Protocol and the Plant Treaty.52  
It is logical that requiring parties to enact national legal regimes consistent with CITES 
would not have been controversial, given that all Partnership member countries had already 
joined this agreement by the time negotiations towards the Partnership began. However, 
like numerous other free trade agreements that have been signed in the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, the Partnership requires member countries to adhere to 
intellectual property treaties of which they were not previously members. This has not been 
the case for international access and benefit sharing agreements.  
In order to truly realise its declared commitment to the protection of biodiversity and the 
interests of local and Indigenous peoples, the Trans-Pacific Partnership should have 
required member countries to join the Nagoya Protocol and the Plant Treaty. Such a 
requirement would have obligated members of the Partnership to implement domestic 
policies for the governance of access and benefit sharing, including the protection of local 
longer negotiable, civil society activists should advocate for future trade agreements to 
require adherence to the access and benefit sharing treaties as a fundamental condition of 
membership.         
IV CONCLUSION 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership is largely a conventional trade deal, taking the form of an 
agreement whose intellectual property conditions have been essentially standardised over 
the past twenty-five years. Despite widespread civil society protests during negotiations, the 
enacted version of the Partnership requires member countries  with the notable exception 
of Aotearoa New Zealand  to adopt UPOV 1991 as a form of intellectual property for 
                                                 
52 Ibid art 20.17(2). 
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plant varieties. Furthermore, although the controversial proposal that would have required 
signatories to make patents available for inventions involving plants and animals was 
dropped from initial drafts of the Partnership, the final version still requires member 
countries to provide protection for inventions that are derived from plants under their 
standards for agricultural innovations, mandating forms of protection that may not be 
appropriately tailored to local conditions. 
On the other hand, the Trans-Pacific Partnership includes certain provisions that 
acknowledge concerns that civil society environmental and Indigenous rights advocates 
have long expressed, representing an advance over earlier free trade agreements. These 
include the commitment that member countries have made to improve their patent 
examination processes to avoid the misappropriation of traditional knowledge related to 
genetic resources, and the recognition of the importance of respecting, preserving, and 
that New Zealand was able to carve out a special exemption to the requirement to join 
UPOV 1991, in addition to policy space to adopt measures the New Zealand government 
deems necessary to protect indigenous plant species in fulfilment of its obligations under 
the Treaty of Waitangi. While early drafts of the Partnership contained more ambitious 
language in relation to the protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions as 
intellectual property, the final version nevertheless demonstrates that possibilities for 
experimentation remain available when negotiating international commercial agreements.  
Civil society activists, local and Indigenous communities, and domestic authorities could 
learn several lessons from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Foremost, the experience of New 
Zealand in negotiating towards the Partnership demonstrates that activism by ethnic 
minority and Indigenous peoples can have a tangible effect on international trade 
agreements. However, this effect may depend on the provision of sufficiently robust legal 
protections for Indigenous rights at the national level, similar to the Treaty of Waitangi 
framework in New Zealand. The Partnership further demonstrates that goals related to 
safeguarding traditional knowledge and native biodiversity can be integrated into a 
globalised trade and intellectual property regime.  
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Future international commercial agreements should build upon the example of the Trans-
Pacific Partnership by requiring signatories to adhere to and implement national laws 
consistent with the access and benefit sharing treaties, especially the Nagoya Protocol and 
conservation of native biodiversity could best be advanced by curtailing the expansion of 
globalised neoliberal capitalism in favour of alternative economic models, the examples of 
policy space described in this article should be explored and exploited.     
